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Abstract. Ergodic stationary states of Minority Games with S strategies per agent
can be characterised in terms of the asymptotic probabilities φa with which an agent
uses a of his strategies. We propose here a simple and general method to calculate these
quantities in batch canonical and grand-canonical models. Known analytic theories are
easily recovered as limiting cases and, as a further application, the strategy frequency
problem for the batch grand-canonical Minority Game with S = 2 is solved. The
generalization of these ideas to multi-asset models is also presented. Though similarly
based on response function techniques, our approach is alternative to the one recently
employed by Shayeghi and Coolen for canonical batch Minority Games with arbitrary
number of strategies.
21. Introduction
The mathematical theory of Minority Games (MGs) with 2 strategies per agent,
particularly for what concerns their ergodic behaviour, largely rests on the possibility
of separating the contribution to macroscopic quantities coming from “frozen” agents
from that of “fickle” ones [1, 2]. Frozen agents are those who use just one of their
strategies asymptotically, whereas fickle agents flip between their strategies even in the
steady state. That these two groups have different impact on the physical properties
of MGs is clear if one thinks that frozen agents are insensitive to small perturbations
and thus they do not contribute to the susceptibility of the system. More generally,
when agents dispose of S > 2 strategies each, the relevant quantity to calculate is the
probability with which an agent uses a of his strategies (a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , S}), knowledge
of which provides all interesting physical observables. On the technical level, this is a
rather complicated problem that has been tackled only recently in [3] for the canonical
S-strategy batch MG. Here we propose an alternative method to derive the desired
statistics in generic canonical or grand-canonical [4] settings with S strategies per agent.
This approach has the advantage of being simpler from a mathematical viewpoint and,
as we will show, easily exportable to other versions of the MG. As in [3], we resort
to path-integral techniques, allowing for a description of the multi-agent dynamics in
terms of the behavior of a single, effective agent subject to a non-trivially correlated
noise. The central idea of the method we propose is to exchange the integration over
the effective noise for one over frequencies using a simple invertible mapping from one
set of variables to the other and the transformation law of probability distributions.
We show that available theories are easily recovered in known cases and, as a further
application, solve the strategy frequency problem for the grand-canonical MG with
S = 2. Since a similar issue arises in the context of multi-asset MGs [5], we also discuss
the (straightforward though heavier from a notational viewpoint) generalisation of this
idea to models in which traders may invest in K ≥ 2 assets.
Since path integrals are by now a somewhat standard technique to deal with MGs,
we shall skip mathematical details and focus our analysis on the resulting effective
dynamics and specifically on the strategy frequency problem. Moreover, we shall reduce
the discussion of the economic meaning of the model to the minimum. The interested
reader will find extensive accounts in [1, 2, 6].
2. Model definitions, TTI steady states and the strategy frequency problem
We consider a market for a single asset with N agents, labeled by i ∈ {1, . . . , N} ≡ ZN .
At each time step ℓ, agents receive an information pattern µ(ℓ) ∈ ZP chosen randomly
and independently with uniform probability and, based on this, they formulate their bids
(represented simply by a variable encoding the agent’s decision, e.g. to buy or sell the
asset). The most interesting phenomenology is obtained when P scales linearly with N ;
their ratio, denoted as α = P/N , is the model’s main control parameter. Every agent i
3disposes of S trading strategies {aµis}s∈ZS , each prescribing a binary action aµis ∈ {−1, 1},
drawn randomly and uniformly, and independently for each strategy s and pattern µ.
The performance of every strategy is monitored by a score function Uis(ℓ) which is
updated by
Uis(ℓ+ 1)− Uis(ℓ) = −aµ(ℓ)is A(ℓ)− ǫis/
√
N (1)
Here, ǫis are real constants representing positive or negative incentives for the agents to
trade, with a factor
√
N ensuring a non-trivial behavior in the limit N → ∞. A(ℓ) is
instead the (normalized) excess demand at time ℓ,
A(ℓ) =
1√
N
∑
i∈ZN
bi(ℓ) (2)
where bi(ℓ) is the bid formulated by agent i at time ℓ. If we denote by si(ℓ) the strategy
chosen by i at time ℓ, then the bid submitted by i is given by
bi(ℓ) =
∑
s∈ZS
nis(ℓ)a
µ(ℓ)
is δs,si(ℓ) (3)
The terms a
µ(ℓ)
is δs,si(ℓ) impose that the agent performs the action dictated by his selected
strategy. The term nis(ℓ) ≡ F [Uis(ℓ)], with F : R → I, denotes a filter linked to the
score of the selected strategies. We focus our attention on two cases:
• Taking F to be the Heaviside function, one has I = {0, 1} so that the filter consists
in either submitting (nisi(ℓ) = 1 for Uisi(ℓ) > 0) or not submitting (nisi(ℓ) = 0 for
Uisi(ℓ) < 0) the bid. This version of the game is usually called grand-canonical MG
[4].
• If F ≡ 1, the filter is absent and agents are forced to play no matter how bad their
scores perform. This corresponds to the standard canonical MG.
It remains to describe how si(ℓ) is chosen. We assume generically that at each time step
agent i employs a rule described by a function gi, namely
si(ℓ) = gi [{Uis(ℓ)}s∈ZS ] (4)
For example, the standard MG with S = 2 corresponds to si(ℓ) = arg maxs∈ZS Uis(ℓ).
(This generalises easily to the case of traders with decision noise [7].) At this stage, we
assume that the gi’s are chosen randomly and independently across agents (from some
distribution) and introduce the density of the mappings {gi}i∈ZN as
W [g] =
1
N
∑
i∈ZN
δ(F )(g − gi) (5)
with δ(F )(· · ·) a functional Dirac delta. A similar random choice is made for incentives
(albeit in general with a different and uncorrelated distribution) and we define their
density as
w(ǫ) =
1
N
∑
i∈ZN
∏
s∈ZS
δ (ǫs − ǫis) (6)
4with ǫ = {ǫs}s∈ZS .
We will work out the ‘batch’ version of the model, which is obtained by averaging
(1) over information patterns [8]. After a time re-scaling (we denote the re-scaled time
as t), one obtains the ‘batch’ dynamics
Uis(t+ 1)− Uis(t) = θi(t)− αǫis − 1√
N
∑
µ∈ZP
aµis
1√
N
∑
s∈ZS
∑
j∈ZN
njs(t)a
µ
jsδs,sj(t) (7)
where θi(t) is a (small) external perturbation added for later use. In dynamical studies,
one is interested in the average bid autocorrelation function
C(t, t′) =
1
N
∑
i∈ZN
[〈bi(t)bi(t′)〉]dis (8)
and in the average response function
G(t, t′) =
1
N
∑
i∈ZN
[
∂ 〈bi(t)〉
∂θi(t′)
]
dis
(9)
where 〈· · ·〉 and [· · ·]dis denote, respectively, averages over paths and disorder. Assuming
that θi(t) = θ(t) for all i, in the limit N → ∞ the multi-agent dynamics (7) can be
described in terms of a self-consistent stochastic process for a single, effective agent
endowed with S strategies, characterized by score functions Us(t), “spin” variable
s(t) = g [{Us(t)}s∈ZS ] and filter ns(t) = F [Us(t)]. This process can be derived by
introducing a generating function of the original dynamics and averaging over disorder
[9]. Details of the calculation follow closely those of similar models reported in the
literature (see e.g. [2]). The effective dynamics ultimately reads
Us(t+ 1) = Us(t) + θ(t)− αǫs − α
∑
t′≤t
[1I +G]−1(t, t′)ns(t
′)δs(t′),s + ηs(t) , (10)
where ηs(t) is a coloured Gaussian noise with first moments given by
〈ηs(t)〉⋆ = 0 (11)
〈ηs(t)ηs′(t′)〉⋆ = δs,s′α[(1I+G)−1C(1I+G†)−1](t, t′) (12)
and where
C(t, t′) =
∑
s∈ZS
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
∫
dgW [g]
〈
ns(t)ns(t
′)δs,s(t)δs,s(t′)
〉
⋆
(13)
G(t, t′) =
∑
s∈ZS
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
∫
dgW [g]
δ
〈
ns(t)δs,s(t)
〉
⋆
δθ(t′)
(14)
are the correlation and response functions, respectively.
We focus henceforth on ergodic steady-state properties, and more precisely on
time-translation invariant (TTI) solutions of (13) and (14). To do so we require
that (a) two-time quantities are Toeplitz-type matrices, i.e. C(t, t′) = C(t − t′),
G(t, t′) = G(t − t′), and that (b) there is no anomalous integrated response, i.e.
χ := limτ→∞
∑
t≤τ G(t) <∞. We denote time-averages as
x = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
x(t) (15)
5Rewriting the scores as Us(t) = tus(t) and averaging over time we obtain
us = θ + ηs − αǫs −m
∑
n∈I
nfns (16)
where we have defined m ≡ α
1+χ
, us = limτ→∞ us(τ) and
fns = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
τ−1∑
t=0
δn,ns(t)δs(t),s (17)
In what follows, we set θ = 0 (the response function can be equally evaluated by a
derivative with respect to the effective noise ηs). Note that (16) describes an ensemble
of processes, since in the stationary limit the noise variables {ηs}s∈ZS are Gaussian
distributed, viz.
P (η) =
∏
s∈ZS
1√
2πς2
exp
[
− η
2
s
2ς2
]
, ς2 =
αc
(1 + χ)2
(18)
where the persistent autocorrelation c = limτ→∞(1/τ)
∑
t≤τ C(t) and susceptibility χ
can be computed through
c =
∑
s∈ZS
∑
n,n′∈I
nn′
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
∫
dgW [g] 〈fnsfn′s〉⋆ (19)
χ =
1
ς2
∑
s∈ZS
∑
n∈I
n
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
∫
dgW [g] 〈ηsfns〉⋆ (20)
The coefficients {fns}n∈I,s∈ZS have the meaning of frequencies. Indeed, fns is the
frequency of use of strategy s when the filter takes the value n. Clearly,∑
n∈I
∑
s∈ZS
fns = 1 (21)
Equation (16) is the staring point of our analysis.The problem consists specifically
in calculating the statistics of the frequency variables. For the sake of clarity, we shall
now work out the mathematical details of the strategy frequency problem in the case
recently addressed in the literature, namely that of the canonical MG (F ≡ 1) with S
strategies [3]. Following sections will address more complicated versions of the model.
3. Canonical batch Minority Game with S strategies
Recalling that for canonical models n = 1, in this section we simplify the notation and
write fs in place of fns. Furthermore, in order to make direct contact with the case
discussed in [3], we assume that ǫs = 0 for each s ∈ ZS and that the density W [g] is a
δ-distribution with
s(t) = g[{Us(t)}] = argmaxs∈ZSUs(t) (22)
The stationary state equations now greatly simplify: for each s we have
us = ηs −mfs , m ≡
α
1 + χ
,
∑
s∈ZS
fs
6where fs is the frequency of use of strategy s. The statistics of the frequencies can be
evaluated as follows. Consider the case in which the effective agent uses a subset of
strategies A ⊆ ZS (A 6= ∅). Due to the rule (22) this automatically implies that
us = u , for s ∈ A , (24)
us < u , for s 6∈ A (25)
with u a generic value of the score velocity. In turn, one has that
∑
s∈A fs = 1, the
rest of the frequencies being identically zero. Let us split the Gaussian variables in two
groups:
ηs =
{
xs for s ∈ A
ys for s 6∈ A
(26)
We have
xs ≡ xs (u, {fs}s∈A) , for s ∈ A (27)
ys < u , for s 6∈ A (28)
where xs (u, {fs}s∈A) ≡ u + mfs The family of equations (27) defines an invertible
mapping {xs}s∈A → (u, {fs}s∈A) whose Jacobian is given by∣∣∣∣ ∂{xs}s∈A∂(u, {fs}s∈A)
∣∣∣∣ = |A|m|A|−1 (29)
where |A| is the cardinality of A. We now have all the information required to compute
the frequency distribution in this case. By simply invoking the transformation law of
probability distribution for the x-variables, i.e.
P (x)dx = ̺(u, f)du df (30)
from whence
̺(u, f) ≡ P [x(u, f)]
∣∣∣∣ ∂x∂(u, f)
∣∣∣∣ , f = {fs}s∈ZS (31)
and the restriction over the distribution of the y-variables, we have that the contribution
to the frequency distribution of the subset A of strategies with score u, denoted ̺A(u, f),
reads
̺A(u, f) = |A|m|A|−1δ
(∑
s∈A
fs − 1
)[∏
s 6∈A
δfs,0
]
P [x(u, {fs}s∈A)]
〈∏
s 6∈A
Θ (u− ys)
〉
y
(32)
where we have used the fact that the noise distribution factorises, i.e. P (η) = P (x)P (y)
and emphasised through the Dirac δ-distributions the constraints over the frequencies‡.
〈· · ·〉y denotes instead average over the statistics of the y-variables.
Now the whole frequency distribution is simply given by the sum over all possible
partitions of ZS (empty set not included). Thus the average over the initial set of
Gaussian variables is converted to average over the frequency distribution:
〈(· · ·)〉⋆ =
∑
A⊆ZS |A6=∅
∫
du df̺A(u, f) (· · ·) (33)
‡ We consider Dirac delta contributions coming from the boundary of the integration region to be
unity.
7A further simplification is allowed here if one restricts the attention to subsets
with |A| = a by considering the frequency distribution of a strategies. By standard
application of combinatorics, one has
̺a(u, f) =
S!
(a− 1)!(S − a)! m
a−1δ
(∑
s∈Za
fs − 1
)[∏
s 6∈Za
δfs,0
]
P [x(u, {fs}s∈Za)]
×
〈∏
s 6∈Za
Θ (u− ys)
〉
y
(34)
and, in turn,
〈(· · ·)〉⋆ =
∑
a∈ZS
〈(· · ·)a〉⋆ =
∑
a∈ZS
∫
du
∫
df ̺a(u, f)(· · ·)1 (35)
Now if we denote by φa the fraction of agents using a strategies, then
φa =
∫
du df̺a(u, f) (36)
It easy to see that for φ1 and φ2 we obtain
φ1 = S
∫
du√
2πς2
e
− (u+m)
2
2ς2
[
1
2
+
1
2
Erf
(
u√
2ς2
)]S−1
(37)
φ2 = S(S − 1)m
∫ 1
0
df√
2πς2
∫
du√
2πς2
e−
(u+mf)2
2ς2 e−
[u+m(1−f)]2
2ς2
[
1
2
+
1
2
Erf
(
u√
2ς2
)]S−2
(38)
which, after some straightforward manipulations, is identified with the corresponding
formulas of [3].
4. Grand-canonical MG with one asset and S strategies
We now turn our attention to the grand-canonical version of the MG with S > 1
strategies strategies per agent. This is obtained by taking, in addition to the rules used
in the previous section, nis(t) = F [{Uis(t)}] = Θ[Uis(t)] instead of F ≡ 1. Now the
stationary state equations read, for each s ∈ ZS,
us = ηs − αǫs −mfs , m ≡
α
1 + χ
, ϕ+
∑
s∈ZS
fs = 1 (39)
where we set f1s = fs and denoted by ϕ the probability that the agent is inactive, that
is the probability that n = 0. In this case the value of the frequencies for n = 0 do
not enter in the relevant equations which determine the quantities of interest of the
model. We proceed to calculate the statistics of the frequencies {fs}s∈ZS and to relate
all quantities to such statistics. As before, let A ⊆ ZS be a subset of strategies being
used, so that
u = us , ∀s ∈ A (40)
u > us , ∀s 6∈ A (41)
8Now we must distinguish three cases: if u > 0, the agent is always active, that is ϕ = 0;
if instead u = 0, the agent is sometimes inactive, that is ϕ > 0; finally if u < 0 then
ϕ = 1 and the agent never invests.
(i) Case u > 0. Here the analysis follows closely the one performed for the canonical
S-strategy MG. The agent is in the market and fs ∈ [0, 1] represents the frequency
of the strategy s being used. This implies that fs 6= 0, ∀s ∈ A and fs = 0 ∀s 6∈ A
with
∑
s∈A fs = 1. We then split the stationary equations (39) into two parts and
write
xs = x
+
s (u, {fs}s∈A) , ∀s ∈ A (42)
ys < u+ αǫs , ∀s 6∈ A (43)
where we have defined the functions
x+s (u, {fs}s∈A) ≡ u+mfs + αǫs (44)
and, as before, denoted as {xs} the Gaussian variables in the subset A and as {ys}
those not belonging to this subset. The set of equations (42) defines an invertible
mapping {xs}s∈A → (u, {fs}s∈A) whose Jacobian reads∣∣∣∣ ∂{x+s }s∈A∂(u, {fs}s∈A)
∣∣∣∣ = |A|m|A|−1 , (45)
with |A| the cardinality of the subset A. Proceeding as in the previous section,
that is using the transformation law of probability distributions, we find that the
contribution to the the frequency distribution of the subset A of strategies, denoted
̺A(u > 0, f), reads
̺A(u > 0, f) = |A|m|A|−1Θ(u)δ
(∑
s∈A
fs − 1
)[∏
s 6∈A
δfs,0
]
P [x+(u, {fs}s∈A)]
×
〈∏
s 6∈A
Θ (u+ αǫs − ys)
〉
y
(46)
(ii) Case u = 0. We now must take into account the fact that
∑
s∈A fs + ϕ = 1 with
0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1. The stationary equations become
xs = x
0
s ({fs}s∈A) , ∀s ∈ A (47)
ys < αǫs , ∀s 6∈ A (48)
with
x0s ({fs}s∈A) ≡ mfs + αǫs . (49)
The set of equations xs = x
0
s({fs}s∈A) defines an invertible mapping whose Jacobian
is ∣∣∣∣ ∂{x0s}s∈A∂({fs}s∈A)
∣∣∣∣ = m|A| (50)
9Therefore the contribution to the frequency distribution in this cases reads
̺A(u = 0, f) = m
|A|δ(u)
∫ 1
0
dϕ δ
(∑
s∈A
fs + ϕ− 1
)[∏
s 6∈A
δfs,0
]
P [x0({fs}s∈A)]
×
〈∏
s 6∈A
Θ (αǫs − ys)
〉
y
(iii) Case u < 0. Finally, if all score velocities are negative then the agent is not on the
market and therefore fs = 0 for all s ∈ ZS with
us = ηs − αǫs , ∀s ∈ ZS (51)
and correspondingly
ρ(u < 0, f) ≡ ρout(f) =
∏
s∈ZS
δfs,0
∫ 0
−∞
du√
2πς2
e
−
(u+αǫs)
2
2ς2 (52)
As was easily expected, the probability that an agent stays out of the market
decreases as S increases, which reflects the simple fact that the availability of larger
strategic alternatives increases the likelihood that an agent has a profitable strategy
among his pool.
Gathering these contributions we finally obtain the probability distribution of the
frequencies and velocity for the subset A of strategies of active players and the fraction
φout of inactive players
̺A(u, f) = |A|m|A|−1Θ(u)
[∏
s 6∈A
δfs,0
]
δ
(∑
s∈A
fs − 1
)
P [x+ (u, {fs}s∈A)]
×
〈∏
s 6∈A
Θ (u+ αǫs − ys)
〉
y
+m|A|δ(u)
∫ 1
0
dϕ δ
(∑
s∈A
fs + ϕ− 1
)[∏
s 6∈A
δfs,0
]
P [x0 ({fs}s∈A)] (53)
×
〈∏
s 6∈A
Θ (αǫs − ys)
〉
y
φout =
∏
s∈ZS
∫ 0
−∞
du√
2πς2
e
−
(u+αǫs)
2
2ς2 (54)
The frequency distribution is simply given by the sum over all possible partition of ZS
(empty set not included). Thus the average over the initial set of Gaussian variables is
converted to average over the frequency distribution
〈(· · ·)〉⋆ =
∑
A⊆ZS
∫
du
∫
df ̺A(u, f) (· · ·) (55)
10
Within this framework, the persistent correlation and susceptibility read
c =
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
S∑
s=1
〈
f 2s
〉
⋆
(56)
χ =
1
ς2
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
S∑
s=1
〈xs(f)fs〉⋆ (57)
where the expression xs(f) in the expression for the susceptibility must be understood
as
xs(f) =
{
x+s (f) , u > 0
x0s(f) , u = 0
(58)
Interesting information is also provided by the fraction φin(A) of active agents using a
certain subset A of strategies
φin(A) =
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
∫
du df̺A(u, f) (59)
To quantify our findings we now consider the cases for S = 1 and 2 explicitly.
4.1. S = 1 (the standard GCMG)
Here the frequency variable represents the frequency with which the agent invests. Its
distribution becomes
̺(u, f) = δf,1Θ(u)
1√
2πς2
e
− (u+m+αǫ)
2
2ς2 +mδ(u)
1√
2πς2
e
− (mf+αǫ)
2
2ς2
̺out(f) = δf,0
∫ 0
−∞
du√
2πς2
e
− (u+αǫ)
2
2ς2 (60)
with ς2 = αc/(1 + χ)2. From here we have the following expression for the persistent
correlation, susceptibility and fraction of active and inactive agents
c =
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
[
1
2
Erfc
(
m+ αǫ√
2ς2
)
+m
∫ 1
0
df√
2πς2
e
−
(mf+αǫ)2
2ς2 f 2
]
(61)
χ =
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
[
1√
2πς2
e
−
(m+αǫ)2
2ς2 +
m
ς2
∫ 1
0
df√
2πς2
e
−
(mf+αǫ)2
2ς2 (mf + αǫ)f
]
(62)
φin =
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
[
1
2
Erfc
(
m+ αǫ√
2ς2
)
+m
∫ 1
0
df√
2πς2
e
−
(mf+αǫ)2
2ς2
]
(63)
φout =
1
2
∫
dǫw(ǫ)Erfc
(
− αǫ√
2ς2
)
(64)
where we have obviously that φin + φout = 1 since the probability ̺(u, f) is indeed
normalised. Taking for the incentives the distribution
w(ǫ) = msδ(ǫ− ǫ) + (1−ms)δ(ǫ+∞) (65)
wherems denotes the fraction of speculators and 1−ms that of producers, one easily sees
that the above equations coincide with those derived for the GCMG (see e.g. [2, 10]).
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4.2. S = 2
The stationary state equations now take the form (39), with ZS = {1, 2}. It is now
convenient to consider the following cases in detail.
(i) Case us = u ≥ 0 for each s.
• If u > 0, then f1 + f2 = 1 and
u = ηs − αǫs −mfs (66)
Inverting this mapping we obtain a contribution to the probability distribution
which reads
̺1(u, f) = 2mΘ(u)δ (f1 + f2 − 1)P [x+(u, {fs}s∈Z2)] (67)
with x+s (u, fs) = u+ αǫs +mfs.
• If u = 0, we have ϕ+ f1 + f2 = 1 with ϕ 6= 0 and correspondingly
̺2(u, f) = m
2δ(u)
∫ 1
0
dϕδ (f1 + f2 + ϕ− 1)P [x0({fs}s∈Z2)] (68)
with x0s(fs) = αǫs +mfs.
(ii) Case us = u > u
′
s for s 6= s′ with u ≥ 0. Proceeding as before:
• If u > 0, then fs = 1 and fs′ = 0, so that
̺3(u, f) = Θ(u)δfs,1δfs′ ,0P [x
+
s (u)]
∫ u
−∞
1√
2πς2
e
−
(u
s′
+αǫ
s′
)2
2ς2 dus′ (69)
with x+s (u) = u+ αǫs +m.
• If u = 0 we have instead
̺4(u, f) = mδ(u)δfs′ ,0
∫ 1
0
dϕδ(fs+ϕ−1)P [x0s(fs)]
∫ 0
−∞
1√
2πς2
e
−
(u
s′
+αǫ
s′
)2
2ς2 dus′(70)
with x0s(fs) = mfs + αǫs.
(iii) Case u1, u2 < 0. Now ϕ = 1. This happens with probability
φout ≡ φ0 =
∫
df
∏
s∈Z2
δfs,0
∫ 0
−∞
1√
2πς2
e
− (us+αǫs)
2
2ς2 dus =
∏
s∈Z2
1
2
(
1 + erf
αǫs√
2ς2
)
(71)
As usual, we divide the population of N agents into two groups, speculators and
producers. As before, the Np producers have only one strategy and play at every time
step (adopting the notation of [4], we write np = Np/P ), whereas the Ns speculator have
2 strategies each (we write ns = Ns/P ). The equations for c, χ and the fraction φa of
speculators using a strategies (a ∈ {0, 1, 2}) take a simpler form when, for speculators,
ǫs = 0 for each s. In this case, for the quantity y =
√
α/c (α = P/N with N = Ns+Np)
and χ one finds
y2 + ns
{(
y2
4
+
1
2
)
erf
y
2
erfc
y
2
− y
2
√
π
exp
(
−y
2
4
)
+
3
4
(
erf
y
2
)2
(72)
− y√
2π
exp
(
−y
2
2
)
+
1
2
erf
y√
2
}
= 1
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whereas
χ
ns(1 + χ)
=
1
2
erf
y
2
erfc
y
2
− y
2
√
π
exp
(
−y
2
4
)
erfc
y
2
+
1
2
(
erf
y
2
)2
−
y exp
(
−y2
2
)
√
2π
+
1
2
erf
y√
2
(73)
φ0 =
1
4
(74)
φ1 = 2
∫
dudf [̺3(u, f) + ̺4(u, f)] =
1
2
+ J(y) (75)
φ2 =
∫
dudf [̺1(u, f) + ̺2(u, f)] =
1
4
− J(y) (76)
with
J(y) =
1√
2π
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−(x+ y)
2
2
]
erf
x√
2
dx (77)
(Note that J(y) ∈ [0, 1/4]. Furthermore, φ0 + φ1 + φ2 = 1.) Solving (73) for y all other
quantities can be immediately evaluated. Fig. 1 reports the behaviour of φ0, φ1 and
φ2 as a function of ns for np = 1. The point where simulations and theory depart can
be computed assuming that χ →∞ (implying the onset of anomalous response). This
gives the critical point ns ≃ 1.88, above which the ergodicity assumptions fail and the
steady state depends on initial conditions. Thus this model displays the standard phase
transition with ergodicity breaking characterizing the original S = 1 GCMG. Similarly
to what happens in the canonical MG, the critical point (which in general depends on
np), decreases as S increases, a reflection of the fact that agents .
5. Generalisation to models with K assets
Multi-asset Minority Games have been introduced in [5] but we shall discuss here a
slightly more general version of the same model. One considers a market with K
assets σ ∈ ZK ≡ {1, . . . , K} and N agents. At each time step ℓ, agents receive K
information patterns µσ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , Pσ} chosen randomly and independently for each
σ with uniform probability and, based on these, they formulate their bids (one bid per
asset at each time step). Pσ is taken to scale linearly with N and we will denote their
ratios as ασ = Pσ/N . For each asset σ, every agent disposes of S trading strategies
{aµσisσ}Ss=1 that prescribe a binary action aµσisσ ∈ {−1, 1}, drawn randomly and uniformly,
and independently for each asset, strategy and pattern. The performance of every
strategy foe each asset is monitored by a score function Uisσ(ℓ) which is updated by the
following rule
Uisσ(ℓ+ 1) = Uisσ(ℓ)− aµσ(ℓ)isσ Aσ(ℓ)− ǫisσ/
√
N (78)
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Figure 1. Top to bottom: the fraction of speculators using 0, 1 and both of their
strategies versus ns at np = 1. Markers denote results of on-line simulations of systems
with NsP = 10
4 averaged over 200 disorder samples per point. ‘Flat’ refers to initial
conditions with Ui,1(0) = Ui,2(0) for all speculators i. ‘Biased’ denotes instead initial
states with Uis(0) = O(
√
N) > 0 and Uis′(0) = 0. Continuous lines are analytic
results, and they have been continued as dashed lines in the non-ergodic region. The
dotted lines joining the markers are a guide for the eye. The dashed vertical line marks
the critical point ns ≃ 1.88 above which the ergodic theory breaks down.
where ǫisσ are real constants representing positive or negative incentives for the agents
to trade, and Aσ(ℓ) is the excess demand of asset σ at time ℓ,
Aσ(ℓ) =
1√
N
N∑
j=1
bjσ(ℓ) (79)
where biσ(ℓ) denotes the bid formulated by agent i in asset σ at time ℓ. Let {siσ(ℓ)}σ∈ZK
be the strategies he chooses for each asset and let Ti(ℓ) ⊆ ZK denote the subset of assets
in which agent i trades at time ℓ. We then write the bid explicitly in the following form:
biσ(ℓ) =
S∑
s=1
1Iσ∈Ti(ℓ)a
µσ(ℓ)
isσ δs,siσ(ℓ)nisσ(ℓ) (80)
Here, the terms a
µσ(ℓ)
isσ δs,siσ(ℓ)nisσ(ℓ) preserve the meaning they had in the single-asset
model. The new term
1Iσ∈T =
{
1 σ ∈ T ⊆ ZK
0 otherwise
(81)
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defines the set of assets in which agent i is active. We assume now that
Ti(ℓ) = hi[{Uisσ(ℓ)}] (82)
siσ(ℓ) = gi[{Uisσ(ℓ)}] (83)
with {gi} and {hi} generic functions describing the strategy and asset selection rule.
In the model described in [5], S = 1 and K = 2 with Ti(ℓ) = {σ˜ ∈ Z2 s.t. σ˜ =
arg maxσ Uisσ(ℓ)δs,siσ(ℓ)}.
The batch dynamics can be analysed in terms of SK effective processes for a single
representative agent:
Usσ(t+ 1) = Usσ(t) + θσ(t)− ασǫsσ
− ασ
∑
t′≤t
[1I+Gσ]
−1(t, t′)nsσ(t
′)1Iσ∈T (t′)δsσ(t′),s + ηsσ(t) , (84)
where {ηsσ(t)} is again a coloured Gaussian noise, viz.
〈ηsσ(t)〉⋆ = 0 (85)
〈ηsσ(t)ηs′σ′(t′)〉⋆ = δs,s′δσ,σ′ασ[(1I+Gσ)−1Cσ(1I+G†σ)−1](t, t′) (86)
and where
Cσ(t, t
′) =
S∑
s=1
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
∫
dgdhW [g, h]
〈
nsσ(t)nsσ(t
′)δs,sσ(t)δs,sσ(t′)1Iσ∈T (t)1Iσ∈T (t′)
〉
⋆
(87)
Gσ(t, t
′) =
S∑
s=1
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
∫
dgdhW [g, h]
δ
〈
nsσ(t)δs,sσ(t)1Iσ∈T (t)
〉
⋆
δθsσ(t′)
(88)
are identified with the bid autocorrelation and response functions of asset σ:
Cσ(t, t
′) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[〈biσ(t)biσ(t′)〉]dis (89)
Gσ(t, t
′) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
∂ 〈biσ(t)〉
∂θiσ(t′)
]
dis
(90)
in the limit N → ∞. In the above formulas, W [g, h] generalizes (5) to include the
function hi:
W [g, h] =
1
N
∑
i∈ZN
δ(F )(g − gi)δ(F )(h− hi) (91)
Proceeding as before, one arrives (with obvious notation) at the following stationary
state process:
usσ = θσ + ησ − ασǫsσ −mσ
∑
T ⊆ZK
∑
n∈I
nfnsσ(T ) (92)
with
mσ =
ασ
1 + χσ
,
〈
η2sσ
〉 ≡ ς2σ = ασcσ(1 + χσ)2 (93)
fnsσ(T ) = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
τ−1∑
t=0
δT ,T (t)1Iσ∈T δn,nsσ(t)δsσ(t),s (94)
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and where the asset-dependent persistent autocorrelation and susceptibility are given
by
cσ =
S∑
s=1
∑
T ,T ′⊆ZK
∑
n,n′∈I
nn′
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
∫
dgdhW [g, h] 〈fnsσ(T )fn′sσ(T ′)〉⋆ (95)
χσ =
1
ς2σ
S∑
s=1
∑
T ⊆ZK
∑
n∈I
n
∫
dǫw(ǫ)
∫
dfdgW [f, g] 〈ηsσfnsσ(T )〉⋆ (96)
Given a subset of assets T , then fnsσ(T ) is the frequency of the asset σ ∈ T being
traded by using the strategy s when an action n has been taken on the market. The
normalization now reads∑
T ∈ZK
1
|T |
∑
σ∈T
∑
n∈I
∑
s∈ZS
fnsσ(T ) = 1 (97)
Let us discuss the simplest case in which F ≡ 1 and S = 1, corresponding to the
canonical multi-asset MG (whose particular case K = 2 is the subject of [5]). Agents
have at their disposal a set of K assets to trade, one each time (i.e. |T | = 1). We
assume that ǫsσ = ǫσ and that the asset selected at time t is given by
σ(t) = h[{Uσ(t)}] = argmaxσ[{uσ(t)}] (98)
Following the same line of arguments one obtains the following expression for the
distribution of frequencies for a subset of assets T being traded in the steady state:
̺T (u, f) =
∑
(σ1,...,σ|T |−1)⊂T
mσ1 · · ·mσ|T |−1δ
(∑
σ∈T
fσ − 1
)[∏
σ 6∈T
δfσ,0
]
×P [x(u, {fσ}σ∈T )]
〈∏
σ 6∈T
Θ (u− yσ)
〉
y
(99)
where
xσ (u, {fσ}σ∈T ) ≡ u+mσfσ − ασǫσ (100)
As before the frequency distribution is given by the sum over all possible partitions of
ZK (empty set not included):
〈(· · ·)〉⋆ =
∑
T ⊆ZK |T 6=∅
∫
du df ̺T (u, f) (· · ·) (101)
Within this framework, the persistent correlation and susceptibility read
cσ =
∑
T ⊆ZK |T 6=∅
∫
du df ̺T (u, f)f
2
σ , (102)
χσ =
1
ς2σ
∑
T ⊆ZK |T 6=∅
∫
du df̺T (u, f) [xσ(u, {fσ}σ∈T )fσ] (103)
whereas the fraction φT of agents trading a certain subset T reads
φT =
∫
du df ̺T (u, f) (104)
It is easily checked that φT satisfies
∑
T ⊆ZK |T 6=∅
φT = 1.
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6. Summary and outlook
Minority Games with S strategies and/or K assets per agent are intriguing
generalizations of the standard MG setup which display a qualitatively similar
global physical picture (e.g. regarding the transition with ergodicity breaking) but
substantially richer patterns of agent behaviour, directly related to the enlargement
of the agents’ strategic endowments. The precise characterization of this aspect, even
in the ergodic regime, poses challenging technical problems which have started to be
analysed only recently. The central issue concerns the calculation of the statistics of the
frequencies with which subsets of strategies are used. This problem was first tackled in
[3], where an explicit solution is derived in the context of canonical batch MGs. In this
work we have presented an alternative and mathematically simpler solution method
(though the complexity of the calculations still increases rapidly with S). We have
shown specifically how to recover the theory of the canonical case and solved explicitly
the grand-canonical batch MG with S strategies per agent. The method also generalizes
to the recently introduced multi-asset models.
The method discussed here can be applied to a number of variants of the basic
setup, some of which may be important from an economic viewpoint (for example in
order to study the emergence of cross-asset correlations). Its main limitation is that,
while the effective-agent dynamics, eqn. (10), holds true in both the ergodic and non-
ergodic phases, our futher focus on time-translational properties limits the rigour of
our conclusions to the ergodic regime. The richness of the MG dynamics is actually
most striking when ergodicity is broken. Multi-strategy MGs are likely to produce a
variety of possible steady states that may require novel observables to be completely
characterised. Up to now, our understanding of non-ergodic regimes relies entirely on
ad hoc heuristic arguments (see for instance [8, 11]) which provide a rough picture of
the geometry of steady states and of the role of initial conditions for obtaining states
of high or low volatility, but a more precise characterization remains elusive. In our
opinion, at the present stage of our theoretical understanding of MGs, any advance in
this direction would be most welcome.
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